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AW HAS AS ITS MISSION the just regulation of human life in society.
This mission is accomplished by legislation which states in schematic,
abstract form, the actions and conduct which can be classified as typical
by the fact that they are more frequently carried out in the social com-
munity, and also establishes specific consequences to the realization of
these actions and conduct. Judge-made law does not formulate abstract
rules; it provides concrete solutions to facts or actions already realized,
but, just as legislation does, it establishes consequences for those actions
or human conducts.
Anatomy of Obligations'
The human conduct with which the law is concerned is conduct of re-
lation, namely, that which enters into the sphere of another person. Law,
then, regulates human relations.. Among these we must distinguish dif-
ferent types, in accordance with their diverse characteristics. For the
purpose of this article, we are interested in those relations known as
obligations.
Obligatory relations are established, as are all other juridical 2 rela-
tions, by a norm of law, be it a statute, a contract or a judicial deci-
sion. In virtue of such norm the result is that A must do, give, or omit
to do something for the benefit of B. Here we have three elements of
the obligation: the prestation, i.e., what is owed, the doing, the giving,
or not doing; the active subject or creditor, that is to say, he who has
t Translated by Hon. Ram6n A. Gadea-Pic6, LL.B., St. John's University; Judge,
Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
*J.S.D., Havana University; former Professor of Law at Villanova University,
Cuba; Professor of Law, Catholic University of Puerto Rico.
I Entenza, Concepci6n normativa de la obligaci6n y del contrato, REVISTA
GENERAL DE LEGISLACI6N Y JURlsPRUDENCIA (Spain Oct. 1961).
These general ideas are here expressed because the author, trained in the
civil law, considers it necessary to make his point of view more intelligible to
readers trained in the common law.
2 1 use the word "juridical" in the sense given by BLACK, LAw DIcTIONARY
(4th ed. 1951) to the term "jural" in its third definition, that is: "recognized or
sanctioned by positive law; embraced within, or covered by, the rules and
enactments of positive law."
OBLIGATIONS
the right to what is owed; the passive sub-
ject or debtor, he who owes. From this per-
spective, the obligation is a relation of
debt, upon which the creditor can demand
a prestation from the debtor, who stands
liberated if he performs, satisfying thereby
the interest of the creditor.
But, what happens if the debtor does not
perform? Generally, the norm that estab-
lishes the relation of debt does not foresee
the consequences of nonperformance. The
judicial decision by which the duty to in-
demnify his victim is imposed upon the
tort-feasor does not say what will happen
if the debtor does not perform. This is
generally provided in some other juridical
precept which, starting off from the possi-
bility of default by the debtor, formulates a
distinct juridical relation in which the jur-
isdictional organ of the state intervenes-
the judge. Under such a precept the prop-
erty of the debtor is placed at the disposal
of the creditor in whatever quantity neces-
sary to satisfy the creditor's interest in the
nonperformed prestation; and the creditor
can demand satisfaction of his interest
through any one of these means, as the
case may require: 1) specific performance;
2) payment of money in an amount
equivalent to the value of the unfulfilled
prestation, or of the benefits which the
creditor would have received through it
(money judgment); 3) the restitution of
whatever was delivered by the creditor to
the debtor in exchange for the unfulfilled
prestation; 4) the termination of the con-
tract; and further, in any of the four cases,
the indemnification for damage and loss
caused by the nonperformance3 This is
the relation of responsibility.
3 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § § 1214-27 (1951).
But, both relations-of debt and of re-
sponsibility-which are in concept dis-
tinguishable, are united by a functional
link, inasmuch as the relation of debt
would be inoperative without that of re-
sponsibility, and the latter is found inter-
acting with the former. Both relations con-
stitute a binomial which is, precisely, the
obligatory relation."
The Source of Obligations
The juridical norm, we have said before
taking the foregoing view of its structure,
establishes the obligatory relation. Every
juridical obligation derives its being from
a norm of law. But this cannot create
obligations arbitrarily in order to accom-
plish its end of realizing a just regulation.
The criterion that the norm takes into con-
sideration in establishing obligatory rela-
tions-that is, endowing particular human
relations with certain juridical efficacy-is
the convenience of giving satisfaction to an
interest worthy of protection of one of the
parties-the creditor-who intervenes in
that relation.
The law confers the dignity of its pro-
tection on an interest when it rests on one
of the following foundations: 1) that the
titular owner of the right has reasonably
relied on the words or actions of the other
' This tendency has the greater number of fol-
lowers among civil law jurists. See I BARASSI,
LA TEORIA GENERALE DELLE OBBLIGAZIONI 90
(Italy 1946, 1948); 2 INSTITUCIONES DE DERECHO
CIVIL 115, 493 (Spain 1955); Carnelutti, Dirritto
e processo nella teoria delle obbligazioni, STUDI
Di DIRITTO PROCESSUALE IN HONORE DI GIUSEPPE
CHIOVENDA 227 (Italy 1927); 1 FERRARA, TRAT-
TATO DE DIrrTo CIVILE ITALIANO 309 (Italy
1921); 1 HERNANDEZ-GIL, DERECHO DE OBLI-
GACIONES 67 (Spain 1960); 1 LARENZ, DERECHO
DE OBLIGACIONES 31 (Spain 1958); 3 STOLFI,
DrRITTO CIVILE 8 (Italy 1932); 1 TUHR, TRATADO
DE LAS OBLIGACIONES 8 (Spain 1943).
person who intervenes in the relation; or
2) has suffered damage, or runs the risk of
suffering it on account of the other person;
or 3) that the latter has unduly enriched
himself at the expense of the other. Thus,
the law recognizes the enforceability of the
interest of the promisee, because the re-
liance put on the promisor's promise in ac-
cepting it is worthy of protection. It also
recognizes the enforceability of the inter-
est of one who suffers damage by the negli-
gence of another, because the survival of
the social community demands that its
members act prudently; and of the interest
of one who becomes poorer without cause
to the benefit of another, because it is just
that everyone should receive his due.
In sum, those three fundamentals of the
juridical recognition of an interest, derive
from two Roman legal principles: alterum
'non laedere and suum cuique tribuere.5
Both are principles of natural law. There-
fore, the establishment of an obligatory re-
lation when one of those three fundamen-
tals is given is based on natural law.
Positive Law v. Natural Law
Positive law does not always impose an
obligation based on the three grounds al-
ready mentioned; namely, reliance, damage
and unjust enrichment. In effect: 6
1) There are cases in which one person
promises and another relies on that prom-
ise and accepts it; nevertheless, there is not
in it a juridical obligation. This happens:
a) when the obligation miscarries be-
cause some legal precept relative to its con-
5 Instituta 1, 1, 3.
6 See RIPERT, LA REGLA MORAL EN LAS OB-
LIGACIONES CIVILEs 283 (Colom. 1946); Berdejo,
Las obligaciones naturales, ESTUlDIOS DE DERECHO
CIvIL 1962 (Spain 1958).
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stitution is broken.7 It so happens, for ex-
ample, if the promisor is incapacitated.8
Or, at common law, if what is promised is
a gratuity; and in civil law, if a donation
is made without observing the formality
prescribed for this type of contract."
b) when the obligation degenerates be-
cause, although initially demandable, after
its birth the law suppresses its enforce-
ability. Such is the case when its action is
barred by the statute of limitations.10
7 See MAZEUD, LECCIONES DE DERECHO CIVIL
528 (Braz. 1960).
8 Precisely the first natural obligations rec-
ognized by the Romans were those relative to
incapacitated persons (children and slaves)
which were under the authority of the same head,
and contracted between them or with their chief.
The term (obligatio naturalis) was also applied
to debts with other incalpacitated persons (slaves,
wards who had the use of reason but lacked the
auctoritas of their guardians) and against whom
there was no possibility of bringing legal action.
See BONFANTE, INSTITUCIONES DE DERECHO
ROMANO 397 (Campuzano rev. Spain 1959);
D'ORs, ELEMENTOS DE DERECHO PRIVADO Ro-
MANO 257 (Spain 1960).
All persons enjoying the free use of their
reason may contract, that is, oblige themselves
by contract under natural law. See MARIN, TEO-
LOGIA MORAL PARA SEGLARES, BIBL. DE AUTORES
CRISTIANOs 494 (Spain 1957).
9 Donation is a contract under the civil law.
Donation, thus conceived, as an accepted promise
of a gratuity, can morally oblige. This moral
obligation can be of fidelity-light-or of jus-
tice-grave. It is of justice if it is solemnly formu-
lated. Such solemnity is not necessarily the one
prescribed by positive law. It is thus possible that
a donation invalid from the point of view of posi-
tive law, may, however, oblige in conscience.
10 For the statute of limitations to also bar a
moral obligation it is necessary that the debtor
has acted in good faith, either positively (belief
that he does not owe) or negatively (belief that
he owes, but that he need not pay until a de-
mand be made). See BITTLE, MAN AND MORALS,
ETHICS 429 (1958). Should he be lacking in
good faith and the requisites established by the
statute of limitations be present, the legal obli-
gation would be extinguished, but the moral
OBLIGATIONS
2) There are cases where an injury has
been caused, and yet no reparation for the
wrong is granted to the victim. it so hap-
pens, for example, when the victim cannot
prove the causal relation between the ac-
tion of the wrongdoer and the damage.11
Another example: At common law the gen-
eral rule was that mental suffering pro-
duced by an act merely negligent is not
compensable if there has been no impact
or physical contact of the wrongdoer with
the victim, or with an interest of the latter
protected by the law.
3) There are cases where unjust enrich-
ment by one person at the cost of another
is produced; nevertheless, no obligation
that could be judicially enforced arises.
Thus, in the civil law, the large dispropor-
tion between the reciprocal performance of
the parties to a bilateral contract does not,
by general rule, engender juridical obliga-
tion against he who made the lesser presta-
tion. This is also true at common law,
which, by general rule, denies juridical im-
port to the inadequacy of consideration. 1 2
In all these cases there is a divergence
between natural and positive law. Positive
law, in effect, refuses to recognize in them
one would survive. See SALSMANS, DEONTOLOGIA
JURIDICA Nos. 178-80 (Zalba rev. Spain 1953).
11 See MARIN, op. cit, supra note 8, at 500.
12Nevertheless, lesion or the inadequacy of
consideration is contrary to commutative justice.
"Et ideo oportet adaequare rem rei: ut quanto
iste plus habet quamsuum sit de eo quod est
alterius, tantundem restituat ei cuius est. Et sic
fit aequalitas secundum 'arithmeticam' medieta-
tern .. " AQUINAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA, II-II,
q. 61, art. 2. For this reason he who has en-
riched himself by the excessively disproportion-
ate prestation of the other party, is morally
obliged to make restitution. See MARiN, op. cit.
supra note 8, at 699; BITTLE, op. cit. supra note
10, at 259.
the existence of obligations recognized by
natural law.
Natural Obligation and Juridical
Obligation
We have, therefore, obligations imposed
by positive law-juridical obligations-
and obligations imposed by natural law
and not recognized by positive law-na-
tural obligations. In them there are no
middle terms: they are either juridical ob-
ligations or natural obligations. 3 There are
no semi-juridical or quasi-juridical obliga-
tions.
If the performance of the obligation is
demandable before judges or courts, the
obligation is juridical. If it is not so de-
mandable, but obliges in conscience, and
positive law recognizes in it certain effects
distinct from its possibility of demand, the
obligation is a natural one.
A natural obligation can be voluntarily
performed, but its performance cannot be
demanded, or, more exactly said, its de-
mand lacks juridical efficacy.
For this reason, some jurists of the civil
law,'14 who start from the supposition that
the relations of debt and of responsibility
are separable-because there are obliga-
tions which create debt only and others
responsibility alone-maintain that a natu-
ral obligation is founded only upon a rela-
tion of debt. There is no basis for this. In
effect, the relation of debt assumes the pos-
sibility that the creditor may demand its
13But see Huizing, A Practical Note on a
Type of Juridical "Positivism," 7CATHOLIC
LAWYER 11, 14-16 (1961).
14The theory was first formulated in Germany
by Gierke and von Amira. From there it passed
to Italy, where it was adopted by jurists of re-
nown. See GANGI, LE OBBLIGAZIONI, PARTE GEN-
ERALE 21 (Gisotti comp. Italy 1941); PACCHIONI,
DIRITTo CIVILE ITALIANO, DELLE OBBLIGAZIONI
IN GENERALE 18 (Italy 1941).
compliance. But, that possibility would be
illusory if the debtor were juridically free,
that is, if no unfavorable juridical conse-
quence were to befall him should he fail to
perform. And inasmuch as in a natural ob-
ligation there is no relation of responsi-
bility, the nonperformance is juridically
ineffectual.
There is not even a juridical debt in a
natural obligation. The "creditor" obtains
nothing by demanding its enforcement. The
only thing he can do is to remain cross-
armed in wait for the "debtor" to perform
when he may care to do so.
But, what would happen if a "debtor"
under a natural obligation performs it, that
is, realizes that to which he is morally
bound?
Performance of Natural Obligation and
Moral Obligation. Just Cause (Causa
Justa) and Good Consideration
At the civil law a prestation which lacks
cause (causa) can be revoked, recovered
or returned to the patrimony of the one
who made it, by the exercise of a proceed-
ing having the same characteristics of the
Roman action of in rem verso.
A clear expression of this principle is
that of Article 1235 of the Code Napo-
leon." The BGB (German Civil Code)
contains an analogous declaration in sec-
tion 812.16 In turn, Articles 1895 et seq. of
"5CODE CIVIL art. 1235 (Fr. 53d ed. Dalloz
1954) provides: "Every payment presupposes a
debt; what has been paid without having been
due, is subject to be recovered."
16 BORGERLICHES GESETZBUSCH § 812 (Ger. 10th
ed, Polandt 1952) provides: "He who ob-
tains something without legal cause through the
prestation of another, or by any other manner
whatsoever at the expense of another, is obliged
to make restitution."
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the Spanish Civil Code, reproduced in the
Puerto Rican Code, Sections 1795 et seq.,
establish the obligation of restitution by
one who received a payment not due to
him.
In the same sense, common law requires
that in order for a conveyance to be sus-
tained the same must be founded upon a
"good consideration."'1 7 The good consid-
eration is thus the basis for a transfer of
property already made.
The juridical "cause" for a conveyance
of property under the civil law, from the
subjective point of view of the one who
carries out the prestation, can be either the
purpose to pay a debt (causa solvendi), or
the animus of liberality (causa donandi),
or the interest of obtaining something in
exchange (causa credendi). The good con-
sideration of common law is equivalent to
that juridical causa, for common law, so
apprehensive always regarding gratuities,
admits that the affections and family rela-
tionship between the one who makes the
delivery (prestation) and the one who re-
ceives it, are good consideration. 8
Therefore, the natural obligation is, in
civil law, juridical causa, and the moral ob-
ligation is, at common law, good consid-
eration for a prestation already made. 19
17 See Brainard v. Commissioner, 91 F.2d 880
(7th Cir. 1937); Sapp v. Lifrand, 44 Ariz. 321,
36 P.2d 794 (1934).
18 Gay v. Fricks, 211 Ala. 119, 99 So. 846
(1924); Sapp v. Lifrand, supra note 17; Higgs
v. Willis, 305 Ga. 857, 55 S.E.2d 372 (1949);
Groves v. Groves, 65 Ohio 442, 62 N.E. 1044
(1902).
19 See Jones v. Loughman, 247 App. Div. 416,
419, 288 N.Y. Supp. 44, 48 (1936), where it is
declared that whatever is paid in compliance with
a moral obligation is not a gift. On the other
hand, in Louisiana, in the expression of motives
in the Civil Code, a distinction is made in ar-
ticle 1758 between moral obligations and natural
OBLIGATIONS
He who received it has in his favor the
soluti retentio, that is, he can retain the
prestation received, if it was founded on
a natural or a moral obligation, and he who
made the prestation cannot, in such a case,
demand its restitution. This is the principal
juridical effect of a natural obligation under
the civil law.20 This is the effect to which
the codes refer when they mention or al-
lude to a natural obligation.
Thus, the second paragraph of Article
1235 of the French Civil Code-whose
first paragraph we have already quoted-
establishes that "no recovery is permitted
in connection with natural obligations that
have been voluntarily paid." And the
Louisiana Civil Code provides in Article
1759 that "although natural obligations
cannot be enforced by action, they have
the following effect: 1) No suit will lie
to recover what has been paid, or given in
compliance with a natural obligation."'21
Section 814 of the BGB refers to the same
effects: "What has been delivered with the
purpose of complying with an obligation
cannot be recovered ...if said prestation
responded to an ethical obligation or to a
measure to be taken in relation to a matter
of decorum." As per Enneccerus, 22 the
obligations to avoid considering, like at common
law, that natural affection is a good considera-
tion. See Woodley, Natural Obligations-Suffi-
ciency As Consideration, 7 LA. L. REV. 445
(1947). In Georgia it is considered that a good
consideration is such as is founded on a strong
moral obligation. GA. CODE ANN. § 20-303
(1935).
20 In fact, it is the only effect granted to it by
some codes which deny to it any other conse-
quences. E.g., CODICE CIVILE art. 2034 (Italy
1942).
21 See Martin, Natural Obligations, Their Char-
acteristics and Enforcement, 15 TtrL. L. REV.
497 (1941).
22 2 ENNECCERUS, Kipp, WOLFF & LEHMAN,
BGB alludes there to a natural obligation,
which he calls "an imperfect obligation."
Article 2034 of the Italian Civil Code of
1942, under the heading "natural obliga-
tions' '13 states that "no recovery at all will
be allowed for whatever has been spon-
taneously given in the execution of moral
or social obligations, except when the ob-
ligation has been fulfilled by an incapaci-
tated person." And the Spanish Civil Code,
(Article 1901) followed by the Puerto
Rican Code (Article 1801) establishes
that "the person from whom the return is
asked may prove that the delivery was
made through liberality or for any other
just cause." The Spanish doctrine is in
unanimous accord in that the reference to
the "just cause" is a reference to a natural
obligation.
So then, a natural obligation has in the
civil law the efficacy of a "just cause" for a
transfer of property, so that its fulfillment
does not produce an undue enrichment.
This effect is also produced by a juridical
obligation. Both coincide in this aspect.
But, while the fulfillment of the juridical
obligation is truly a payment, because what
was juridically owed has been satisfied, on
the other hand the fulfillment of a natural
obligation is not a true payment, for noth-
ing is juridically owed under it. Now then,
it is not a donation either, because one
who complies with a natural obligation
does not do it through mere liberality, but
because his conscience impels him to com-
ply with a duty. Consequently, the fulfill-
ment of the natural obligation lies be-
TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL 12-13; 3 HEDEMANN,
TRATADO DE DERECHO CIVIL 80, 496 (Spain
1958).
23The implications of that title have been
pointed out by GIOiGIANNI, LA OBLIGACI6N,
PARTE GENERAL 107 (Spain 1958).
tween a donation and a payment as just
causes for a transfer of property.24
This, which is the juridical effect of a
natural obligation to which the civil law
has given more attention, is precisely the
effect of least importance in a legal system
such as the civil law, which recognizes lib-
erality as a just cause for a property trans-
fer. In truth, if mere liberality is admitted
as a just cause, one cannot advert to what
difficulty could exist in also recognizing as
a just cause the fulfillment of a natural ob-
ligation. This difficulty appears only when
he who complies with a natural obligation
does so believing that he was juridically
bound to comply. Only that case should
have merited the attention of the civil law.
At common law, on the other hand, the
efficacy of the moral obligation as a suffi-
cient consideration is of no such great im-
portance. The vexing problem of common
law is to determine if a moral obligation is
a sufficient consideration.
24 Now, then, as it does not respond to a legal
duty, the fulfillment of a natural duty raises
the presumption of fraud of creditors, as if
under a gratuity. See I MARTY & RAYNAUD,
DROIT CIVIL 413-14 (1961); Huizing, A Prac-
tical Note on a Type of Juridical "Positivism,"
7 CATHOLIC LAWYER 11 (1961); Martin, supra
note 21. On the contrary, Woodley maintains
in regard to Louisiana, that the promise backed
by a natural obligation falls under the category
of onerous obligations. Woodley, supra note 19.
CODIGO CIVIL DE ESPAKA art. 1297, and arti-
cle 1249 of its Puerto Rican equivalent, declare:
"Contracts by virtue of which the debtor alien-
ates property gratuitously are presumed to be
executed in fraud of creditors." It is interesting
to remark that the official English version of
Article 1249 of the Puerto Rican Civil Code
translates the Spanish expression "a titulo gra-
tuito," which we have translated as "gratuit-
ously," with the English expression "for a good
consideration," which in our opinion entails a
grave confusion.
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Moral Obligation and Sufficient Con-
sideration. Contractual Cause, Form
and Natural Obligation
In common law, just as in the civil law,
"a mere promise without more . . .is un-
enforceable. 25
Both by the civil law and the common
law, persons were guarded against haste
and imprudence in entering into voluntary
agreements. The distinction between
"nudum pactum" and "pactum vestitum,"
by the civil law, was in the formality of
execution and not in the fact that in one
case there was a consideration, and in the
other none, though the former term, as
adopted in the common law, has a signifi-
cation of a contract without consideration.
The latter was enforced without reference
to the consideration, because of the for-
mality of its ratification.
2 6
We derive from these citations that in
order for a "meeting of the minds" to be
binding at common law, it must, in prin-
ciple, be set in writing under seal, or that a
consideration must have been given. The
consideration is, therefore, a juridical
cause for a contract at common law.
That consideration, in accordance with
the concept of bargain given to a contract
by the common law, must be something
given or offered in exchange for a prom-
ise.27
This concept of a contract as a bargain
and of consideration as something given
in exchange for the promise which pre-
dominates in common law2 8 eliminates
25 Stonestreet v. Southern Oil Co., 226 N.C.
261, 37 S.E.2d 676 (1946).
26 Aller v. Aller, 40 N.J.L. 446 (1878).
27 RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 75 (1932).
28 Hamson, The Reform of Consideration, 54
L.Q. REv. 233, 235 (1938); see Note, 16 MINN.
L. REv. 808 (1932).
OBLIGATIONS
from its contractual sphere an informal
promise founded only upon a liberality.
For that same reason, common law also
denies the contractual nature or the pos-
sibility of juridical demand to a promise
founded only on the animus to comply
with a moral obligation.
In the famous case of Hawkes v. Saun-
ders,2 9 Lord Mansfield declared that when
one promises to pay a moral obligation,
"the honesty and rectitude of the thing is
a consideration." But in the equally fa-
mous case of Eastwood v. Kenyon, 30 Lord
Denman changed that doctrine, reasoning
that it "would annihilate the necessity for
a consideration at all, inasmuch as the
mere fact of giving a promise creates a
moral obligation to perform it." Neverthe-
less, this argument is erroneous, 31 in the
first place, because the moral obligation re-
ferred to when one speaks of it as being or
not being a sufficient consideration, is one
pre-existing the promise; and in the second
place, because not every promise creates
a moral obligation to perform it.3 2
On the other hand, there are two rea-
sons which militate against the idea of
holding a moral obligation as considera-
tion:
1) Consideration is not a loose bolt in
the gears of contract at common law. Con-
sideration, on the contrary, is its axis.
Then, if the contract is conceived by the
common law as a bargain, consideration
must in consequence be held to be some-
thing which is given or offered in exchange
29 1782 Cowper 289. See Hassinger v. Solms,
5 S. & R. 4, 15 (1824): "Ties of conscience on
an upright man are sufficient consideration."
3011 A. & E. 450.
31 See 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 230 (1951).
32 See notes 8, 9, & 10 supra.
for a promise. The act realized by the
promisee and which created a moral obli-
gation for the promisor was not bargained
for the promise; it is an act which was not
requested for by the promisor, nor one that
the promisee could confidently hope would
move the promisor to offer repayment
therefor. 3 3 Then, it is not really a consid-
eration.
2) Given the materialistic sense in which
contractual law is considered by common
law, in order that a consideration may sup-
port a promise, it has to be a valuable
consideration. But "honesty and recti-
tude," or the "ties of conscience" are not
valuable. They thus lack an essential at-
tribute that would make them a considera-
tion.
Yet, the treatment of a contract by the
common law as a bargain has become re-
laxed,34 and numerous exceptions have
been made. 35 It is now admitted that not
only the seal or the quid pro quo are suffi-
cient reasons for the juridical exaction of a
promise, but also that the reliance and
change of the juridical position of the
promisee may make demandable a promise
given without consideration. 36 Neither has
there been difficulty in accepting that a
previous voidable or lapsed obligation will
33 In a contrary case, there would be something
more than a moral obligation.
34 SEE POUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHI-
LOSOPHY OF LAW (1954).
35RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 85-90 (1932).
36 Id. at § 90. This section has been applied in
numerous instances. Among the recent ones are:
Air Conditioning Co. v. Richards Constr. Co.,
200 F. Supp. 167 (1961); Owen v. Sumrall, 204
Miss. 15, 36 So. 2d 800 (1948); American Hand-
kerchief Corp. v. Frannat Realty Corp., 17 N.J.
12, 109 A.2d 793 (1954); Schafer v. Fraser,
206 Ore. 446, 290 P.2d 190 (1955); Hill v. Cor-
bett, 33 Wash. 2d 219, 204 P.2d 845 (1949).
support an ulterior promise by the ob-
ligee.'7
Regarding both types of cases the ques-
tion now arises whether the pre-existing
reliance and obligation are consideration,
or if in such cases consideration is or is not
a prerequisite. 3
The most favored criterion, given the
structure of contracts at common law,
seems to be that of the Restatement of
Contracts, according to which in such
cases a consideration is unnecessary, be-
cause the pre-existing reliance and obliga-
tion realize the same function as a consid-
eration; that is, they serve as the founda-
tion-as cause-for the legality of a "meet-
ing of the minds."
Following such a course the promise
to perform a moral obligation could be
made enforceable at law. But it should be
well understood that as long as the com-
mon law maintains its concept of the con-
tract-and, therefore, of consideration-
no one can speak of a moral obligation as
consideration. Should it be judged that the
circumstances of a case do warrant it, the
requisite of consideration could be ex-
cluded in the presence of a moral obliga-
tion, this being, in such a case, a sufficient
cause for the legal character of the prom-
ise; but it should not be said that the moral
obligation is consideration.
In civil law the problem to be deter-
37RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 36, 89 (1932).
38 For an interesting discussion of the question
in relation to the reliance placed upon gratui-
tous promises, see the opinion of Judge Cardozo
in Allegheny College v. National Chautauqua
County Bank, 246 N.Y. 369, 159 N.E. 173(1927). Regarding reliance, see Porter v. Com-
missioner, 60 F.2d 673 (2d Cir. 1932); Devec-
mon v. Shaw, 69 Md. 199, 14 Atd. 464 (1888);
Boyer, Promissory Estoppel- Principle From
Precedents, 50 MicH. L. REV. 639 (1952).
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mined in the face of a promise to fulfill a
natural obligation is not whether the causa
is necessary or not, but whether the for-
malities required for the donation should
of necessity be complied with.
A donation is a gratuitous act. It is not
the only one, but the most typical of such
acts. In civil law the causa for a donation
is the mere liberality of the donor. This is
a weak cause; such weakness is manifested
in diverse manners. One of these is that
it must be accompanied by a formality.
Thus, a donation, in the civil law, is a
formal contract.
It is, therefore, important to determine
if the promise to perform a natural obli-
gation is a gratuitous act, an onerous one,
or an intermediate act, in-between the on-
erous and the gratuitous. To be more pre-
cise, the question is reduced to determine
if this act is a donation or not, inasmuch
as the problem of formality is not present
in connection with all gratuitous acts, but
only in that relative to donation.
The opinions of commentators and jur-
isprudents of the civil law are divided as
to whether the promise to perform the natu-
ral obligation is a gratuitous act distinct
from donation, or an onerous act, or one
in-between, but there is unanimity in con-
sidering it not to be a donation.39
If one views this problem from a realis-
tic perspective, the question is not trying to
adjust conceptual forms to reality, nor in
trying to learn if the promise to perform
a natural obligation is a donation, but
whether it is convenient, in order to make
3.1 See 1 GORLA, EL CONTRATO 151 (Spain 1959);
1 MARTY & RAYNAUD, DRorr CivIL 413-14
(1961); Woodley, Natural Obligations-Suff-
ciency As Consideration, 7 LA. L. REV. 445
(1947).
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such promise demandable in law, that it
should be accompanied by the formality
prescribed for donation.
The case law of civil law countries of
the Mediterranean has declared that the
promise to perform a natural obligation
does not have to be formal: it is sufficient
if it is an earnest promise, even if only
verbal, or not accepted in writing. 40
The pre-existing natural obligation is,
then, a substitute of formality; it is some-
thing that makes formality unnecessary,
because it does fully realize the canalizing
and cautionary functions which it is in-
tended to provide," i.e., because it serves
as the adequate medium to indicate that
the matter is juridical and to avoid that
the promisor should make an insincere
offer or act incautiously or imprudently.
Important Legal Characteristics of
Natural and Moral Obligations
The debate around the concept of a
natural obligation refers us, in the end, to
a debate about law. Those who adopt a
positivist point of view of legal precepts-
the traditionalist doctrine-tend to reduce
the sphere of natural obligations to those
obligations which could be legal or which
4oThe decision of the Supreme Court of Spain
of October 17, 1932 declares that in a case
where the promise was not accepted in writing,
the "formal" promise to perform a natural ob-
ligation converts it into a legal obligation. "For-
mal" must be here understood in the same
sense as "serious." See comments on this im-
portant Spanish decision in Berdejo, Las Ob-
ligaciones Naturales, ESTUDIOS DE DERECHO
CIVIL 1962 (Spain 1958); GORLA, supra note 39,
at 178, vol. 2, at 317.
41 IHERING, THE SPIRIT OF ROMAN LAW No. 45;
Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L.
REV. 800 (1941); Entenza, Los principios gen-
erales del Derecho contractual puertorriquefio, 3
REVISTA DE DERECHO PUERTORRIQUEINO.
were so previously, and which could not
become such because they were rendered
inefficacious by a norm of law (imperfect
legal obligations) .4" On the other hand,
those who adhere to the natural law are
wont to broaden the concept to make it in-
clude every intersubjective moral duty, that
is, those originating from the relations of
two subjects or persons.
An intermediate position would limit
moral duties which constitute natural obli-
gations to those having economic import.
In the treatises and legal systems of civil
law countries, there is a general tendency
to identify natural obligations with moral
duties, or, at least, to consider a moral
duty as the essential core of a moral obli-
gation.
But those legal systems consider natural
obligations in relation to their effect of
avoiding recovery of payment; not so as to
the other effect of making unnecessary the
formalities of donation with respect to the
promise of performance.
It is, therefore, convenient to distin-
guish what characteristics the natural ob-
ligation must contain - and, in like man-
ner, the moral obligation-so that the law
may recognize their ability to produce each
of the following effects:
I) That of avoiding recovery of pay-
ment and of being the foundation for an
executed contract:
The most certain way of expressing this
effect of a natural obligation is that used,
without naming it, in the Spanish Civil
Code (Article 1901) and in the Puerto
Rican Civil Code (Article 1801), that it is
"just cause" for the payment.13
42LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 1758 (West 1952);
Mills v. Wyman, 3 Pick. 207 (Mass. 1826);
Court of Appeals of Rome, Italy, July 20, 1884.
43The expression "just cause" is translated in
Even an intransigent positivist could ad-
mit without great effort, or sacrifice of his
convictions, that the expression "just
cause" may comprise a moral duty. It can-
not, in effect, be denied that it is just to
pay that which is morally owed.
The doctrine requires that these moral
duties shall be endowed with certain quali-
ties in order that they may constitute natu-
ral obligations. But really, the only essen-
tial quality is that they be intersubjective,
flowing from one party to the other. The
other qualities that the doctrine demands
(that they be typical, that there be a coun-
terprestation, and economic import) are
accidental qualities which may or may not
enhance the moral duty which integrates
the natural obligation. Its presence will
unquestionably persuade the judge to rec-
ognize in that moral duty the same legal
character as belongs to a natural obliga-
tion, but its absence does not eliminate the
possibility of such recognition.
The writers insist, above all, on the eco-
nomic import. We shall not deny its im-
portance. Certainly, it realizes two func-
tions worthy of consideration: one of
measure, the other of persuasion, as we
shall see.
If the moral duty consists in giving, do-
ing or not doing something which is eco-
the official English edition of the Puerto Rican
Civil Code as "sufficient cause." This is pat-
ently erroneous, for several reasons, among
them: that it transfers the qualification from the
qualitative aspect (justice) to the quantitative
(sufficiency); that the reference to "just cause"
is a call to natural law, whereas "sufficient cause"
suggests reasons of opportunity and of policy,
which are essentially contingent; that the proper
qualifications applicable to the "cause" of the
civil law are "valid" or "invalid," "just" or "un-
just," "proximate" or "remote," but never "suffi-
cient" or "insufficient," implies an inexcusable
confusion between "cause" and consideration.
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nomically appreciable, this value gives the
measure of payment; what is paid up to
that limit is well paid and its return can-
not be demanded; whatever is paid beyond
that limit, without the intention of confer-
ring a benefit, may be repaid. On the other
hand, if the moral duty lacked economic
content, the nature and the quantity of
what would have to be paid would be of
difficult determination.
This, which, as we see, is reduced to
terms of the easy and the difficult, and not
of the possible or impossible, takes us to a
second plane wherein we advert to the eco-
nomic import of moral duty. For, in effect,
precisely because of that easiness or diffi-
culty in appreciating the object of the pay-
ment of a moral duty, we will find the
greater easiness or the greater difficulty-
we are still in the sphere of the possible-
in attributing legal efficacy to moral duty.
Having established that it is not indis-
pensable that the moral duty have eco-
nomic import in order to be contained in
a natural obligation, there arises one other
question: How can we know that we are
in the presence of a moral duty?
Here it is necessary to establish a dis-
tinction, bearing in mind that under the ex-
pression "moral duties," before the eyes of
the law, fall those properly called moral
and those called "of honor." Regarding
the latter, the judge must search the man-
ner of thought of the social community
and in this search the point of view of the
judge as to what is honorable will unques-
tionably have an extraordinary importance.
With respect to duties properly called
moral, the judge will have to ignore his
own personal criterion and rely on the
opinion of the moralists, as he would on
the opinions of writers of another country
if he were called to apply the law of that
OBLIGATIONS
particular jurisdiction.
We believe that these conclusions are
admissible at common law when necessary
to determine if a moral duty is good con-
sideration for an executed contract, save
what the Statute of Frauds may prescribe.
2) With respect to the effect of making
unnecessary the formalities and of consti-
tuting a sufficient consideration for the
promise to perform:
In the civil law the question has not
been formulated in such definite terms as
in common law, but it must be borne in
mind that in all cases where the civil law
courts have declared that a promise to per-
form a natural obligation is not subject to
the formalities of donation, the natural ob-
ligations have had economic import.
Perhaps that orientation of the civil law
cases does not respond to a preconceived
tendency, but only to a mere coincidence.
But, it is evident that to require that the
natural obligation have economic conse-
quences, in order to exempt the promise to
perform a natural obligation from the for-
malities, responds to a necessity: that of
security. 44 The economic implication then
comes to fulfill the same function as the
formality: that of alerting the promisor and
of imposing a definite legal character to the
promise.
And then, just as the promise to fulfill
44 GORLA, supra note 39, at 170.
a natural obligation does not require the
formalities if such obligation carries with
it economic import, likewise the promise
to perform a moral obligation need not be
accompanied by a consideration if that
moral obligation has economic implica-
tions. The point is not that the moral obli-
gation plus the economic import provide
sufficient consideration, but that a consid-
eration as such is not necessary in that
case.
With this, the promise to perform a
moral obligation poses no problem of de-
termining if it is, or is not, sufficient con-
sideration; but, just as in the case of a
gratuitous promise where the promisee has
placed upon it a reasonable reliance chang-
ing his position, the problem presented is
that of determining if the circumstances
involved will justify the enforcement of
performance even if consideration is lack-
ing.
We hold that if the moral obligation has
economic import, the decision must be in
favor of the promisee. We see no reason
why he should be in a poorer position than
a promisee who, relying on a promise made
without consideration, has altered his posi-
tion. With so many doors now opened to
the escape of the requisite of consideration,
this admittance of the promise to perform
a moral obligation with economic import
seems to be capable of being resolved with-
out serious disturbance.
